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W.: Constitutional Law--Interstate Commerce--State Control of Interst
CASE COMMENTS
plished even with the removal of the undesirable provisions of the
California statute. At a reasonable time before the scheduled execution of the prisoner, the state could allow an adversary proceeding
in which the question of the prisoner's sanity could be determined.
At this proceeding, the prisoner or any persons desiring to speak
for him should be permitted to introduce any evidence relevant to
the question of the prisoner's sanity. The warden of the prison may
represent the state and make an initial determination of the prisoner's sanity at this proceeding. His decision could be reviewable
by the highest executive of the state. The precedent against reviewing executive clemency would insure that the decision made
by him on review of the warden's decision would be final. To assure
the prisoner an opportunity to be heard, the determination of the
question of his sanity should be on a procedural basis and not a
discretionary one as is the usual case. When one takes cognizance
of the finality of an execution, the suggested procedure hardly
seems unduly time-consuming. Since neither the State of California
nor the Supreme Court of the United States has devised a satisfactory method of recalling a departed prisoner from the great beyond
and compensating him for the unpleasantness which would necessarily be occasioned by an improper execution, it hardly seems unreasonable to expect adequate procedural safeguards to prevent
such an improper execution from occurring.

J. J. P.
CONsTrtrONAL LAW-INTERSTATE COMMERCE-STATE CONTROL

OF INTERsTATE

AcraTr.-D, an interstate motor carrier, was con-

victed and fined by the Public Service Commission of Virginia for
operating in intrastate commerce without a certificate of convenience and necessity. The facts disclosed that D accepted goods
in the state for transportation to other points within the state,
shipped them to a point outside the state, and then to their destination. The normal routes for transportation between these points
of origin and destination did not require that the goods leave the
state. Held, that use of such circuitous routes nonetheless constituted intrastate commerce and the carrier was subject to penalties
for so operating without a state certificate. Service Storage & Transfer Co. v. Commonwealth, 102 S.E.2d 339 (Va. 1958).
That the state has exclusive control of internal commerce under
U. S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, and U. S. CONST. amend. X is a doctrine
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so well established that it may not be questioned here. Elberton
Southern Ry. v. State Highway Dep't, 211 Ga. 838, 89 S.E.2d 645
(1955); People v. Asta, 337 Mich. 590, 60 N.W.2d 472 (1953). This
doctrine retains its validity even where there is an indirect or incidental effect on interstate commerce. Elberton Southern Ry. v. State
Highway Dept, supra.
Likewise, it is well settled that the governmental regulation and
supervision by a state of its internal commerce may lawfully be
exerted through validly constituted administrative commissions or
boards. Pennsylvania R.R. v. Towers, 245 U.S. 6 (1917).
The Public Service Commission is an administrative agency
of the legislature which also has quasi judicial functions, and its
acts are subject to judicial review. Cage v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
125 Pa. Super. 330, 189 Atl. 896 (1937). Whether a carrier's transportation of intrastate freight over an indirect interstate route is
bona fide interstate commerce or merely subterfuge to avoid the
jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission is primarily an administrative question to be determined by the commission. Baltimore-Washington Express Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 209 Md. 121,
120 A.2d 363 (1956); Blackmore v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 120 Pa.
Super. 437, 183 AU. 115 (1936); Atlantic Freight Lines v. Public
Util. Commn, 163 Pa. Super. 215, 60 A.2d 589 (1948).
Although pure questions of fact are for the Public Service Commission and not for the court, sufficient legally competent evidence
is necessary to support findings of fact by the commission and to
sustain its order. The commission cannot be capricious, arbitrary,
or unreasonable, and an order of the commission not founded on
competent and relevant evidence or otherwise not in conformity
with law is subject to reversal. Pennsylvania Tel. Corp. v. Public
Util. Comm'n, 153 Pa. Super. 316, 33 A.2d 765 (1943). In Eastern
CarrierCorp. v. United States, 31 F. Supp. 232 (M.D. Pa. 1939),
the court stated "... we may not overrule findings in this connection
unless we find them to be arbitrary or capricious or not supported
by substantial evidence." At this point, it may be added that a
failure to include essential evidence in the record is a bar to the
jurisdiction of the appellate court to pass upon the evidence upon
which the commission's findings were based. Louisiana& Pine Bluff
R.R. v. United States, 257 U.S. 114 (1921).
Considering the essential distinctions between interstate and
intrastate commerce, the rule, broadly stated in ascertaining whether
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transportation is interstate or intrastate is determined by its essential
character from a consideration of all pertinent circumstances, and
one of the most important tests is the intention of the parties in
respect thereto and the manner of carrying out such intention. State
v. Western Trans. Co., 241 Iowa 896, 43 N.W.2d 739 (1950). In
Blackmore v. Public Serv. Commn, supra, it was held that evidence
that motor carriers transported freight moving between Pennsylvania termini over a route partly in another state as mere subterfuge to avoid regulation by the Public Service Commission supports
findings that such movement was intrastate commerce. As to what
constitutes subterfuge, the general proposition is that the solution
of the problem depends upon the places of origin and destination
and whether the routes are reasonable and necessary. BaltimoreWashington Express Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'rn, supra. Touching
of soil of another state, which was not in the ordinary course of
business and an orderly and economical transaction of freight movement, does not make such movement interstate commerce and
beyond state control. Blackmore v. Public Serv. Comm'n, supra. To
constitute bona fide interstate commerce, it must appear that the
goods have entered upon transportation to another state or have
been delivered to the carrier for that purpose. State v. Western
Trans. Co., supra.
From these authorities, several general propositions can be
deduced. Among these are: the state may control internal commerce; this control may be exercised through a validly constituted
commission; the question of whether transportation is interstate or
intrastate commerce, is one directed to the judgment of the commission; the findings of the commission are subject to judicial review,
but will not be overruled unless shown to be arbitrary, capricious,
or unreasonable, or not founded on legally competent evidence; and,
if there is mere subterfuge to avoid state regulation, the transportation will be held to be intrastate in character.
In the principal case, the only question of importance is whether
the transportation is interstate or intrastate in character. The places
of origin and destination are within the state and the route outside
the state is neither necessary nor reasonable, thus the finding of
subterfuge is justified. By the overwhelming weight of authority,
subterfuge to avoid state regulation will not convert intrastate
transportation into interstate commerce. The decision of the Virginia court has sound basis in both authority and logic.

J. F. W., Jr.
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